American Restraint and Its Limits

Will Beijing Accept a Decent Peace?

On January 12, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered what he intended as a routine address to the National Press Club outlining American policy in Asia. He described a “defensive perimeter” running from the Aleutians through Japan and the Ryukyus to the Philippines — and in so doing, neglected to name South Korea as a core American protectorate.

Five months later, North Korean tanks crossed the 38th parallel. Whether Acheson’s omission actually encouraged Kim Il-sung’s aggression remains the subject of historical debate — Soviet archives opened after 1991 suggest the decision for war was already in motion. But the perception mattered: Ambiguity about American interests in Asia was interpreted in Pyongyang and Moscow as permission to act. When it turned out that American interests in Korea were far more vital than American rhetoric had conveyed, the result was a three-year war that killed nearly 37,000 Americans and drew China into direct military confrontation with the United States.

Seventy-five years have passed, and Beijing again risks misreading apparent American restraint as permission to press the envelope.

Trump is offering China something no prior administration would consider: a “decent peace” that makes space for its rising power.

Will Beijing understand and accept the limits of the deal on offer — or will it squander a generational opportunity through overreach?

The Rise of the Restrainers

There can be little doubt the “Restrainers” are winning a 30-year struggle to seize the reins of Republican foreign policy, shaping American conduct in irreversible ways that are uncomfortable for many in Washington to accept.

Their ascent has been most evident in the conduct of America’s China policy. In the months following President Trump’s tactical détente with Xi Jinping in Busan, his administration has struck a deal to keep TikTok under ByteDance’s effective control, turned a blind eye to PRC military pressure against Japan and Taiwan, reduced Chinese tariffs such that they are barely higher than those on some American allies, reversed export controls on advanced AI chips, eliminated offices focused on technology competition and foreign malign influence, and dissuaded Congress from taking more strident action to countenance China’s transgressions.

Trump has personally promoted the frame of a U.S.-China “G2,” preferring to focus on accumulating American power by picking more limited, winnable fights. The United States is today offering China what amounts to a radical departure from the logic of great-power competition that animated American policy for the better part of a decade: A decent peace in Asia, and a mutually beneficial economic relationship that accommodates rising Chinese power.

Many Republicans — who have long taken pride in defending against Chinese predation — are struggling to accept this reality. Some maintain that this transactional dealmaking might actually constitute a continuation or even elevation of U.S. strategic pressure against Beijing in specific theaters, which had for so long been an essential component of the party’s identity.

But for their part, Chinese officials see this for what it is: a titanic change in U.S. policy. Many express relief that Washington has finally arrived at an “accurate perception” of Chinese power, while others suggest that “MAGA and China need not be enemies.” Some interlocutors today feel so confident in their position that, in the pages of Foreign Affairs, they now pitch a “grand bargain” with the United States.

To be sure, there has been a massive update in U.S. perceptions of Chinese power: For the first time, most Americans today consider China to be even more powerful than the United States. The danger is that all this confidence risks strangling the very future Beijing had worked so desperately to engineer. Across multiple domains, in multiple theaters, China is testing the United States. Since December, it has brazenly hacked the phones of Congressional staff, launched record-setting live-fire military exercises around Taiwan, and slow-walked agricultural purchases and rare earth licenses — perhaps assuming the United States lacks the capacity or political will to push back.

The fragile U.S.-China détente put forward by the Trump administration deserves serious consideration — but whether it lasts will hinge on what China does next. The Busan hangover is already setting in. Any overreach now is sure to drag both countries back into catastrophic confrontation.

Two Things Beijing Should Understand

Chinese strategists should understand two uncomfortable truths about the “deal” on the table:

First, what some analysts have labeled American “retreat” is better understood as American optionality. Analysts who read retrenchment into the current posture are mistaking tactical irreverence for strategic withdrawal. The reality is that Washington is pressing hard-line negotiations with allies and adversaries alike, not abandoning the field. The 2026 National Defense Strategy clarifies that the U.S. conception of a “balance of power” will not accept Chinese primacy in Asia, nor will it cede a “sphere of influence” to any other hegemon. The document plainly states that America’s goal “is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them.” Instead, it offers Beijing what Secretary Hegseth’s transmittal letter calls “a decent peace” — one “on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under.” Yet even as it extends this olive branch, the NDS commits to maintaining “a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain” — one which will surely include continued military exercises with allies, weapons sales to Taiwan, and “the ability to conduct devastating strikes and operations against targets anywhere in the world.”

What Beijing perceives as American weakness, Washington is perceiving as mere negotiating posture. However misguided, the United States does actually believe it can simultaneously demand unprecedented burden-sharing from Tokyo and Seoul, technology transfer from Taipei, and mineral rights in Greenland — while still retaining the fundamental architecture of U.S.-led security in the Indo-Pacific. At Davos, Secretary Bessent delivered an earnest message: “America first does not mean America alone.” The administration’s routine statements of concern about PRC provocations are not hollow. Even as it presses allies to share more in the burden of their own defense, the United States has continued pre-positioning matériel and building infrastructure to balance against PRC dominance in Asia. The President may cultivate a productive relationship with Xi Jinping, but his administration’s fundamental assessment of China — as a rival to be checked, not a hegemon to be accommodated — has not changed.

Second, the promise of a “decent peace” is conditional, and American red lines have not moved. The NDS conclusion contains language Beijing should read carefully: “If our potential opponents are unwise enough to reject our peaceful overtures and choose conflict instead, America’s armed forces will stand ready to fight and win the nation’s wars.” This is not the language of a power in retreat, but the language of a superpower offering terms of coexistence — and warning of dire consequences if those terms are refused.

The United States retains extraordinary economic interests in Asia and considers China its primary rival within that theater. While Washington under Trump has signaled it will not attempt to collapse China’s economy, threaten the leadership of the CCP, or contain its technological rise, U.S. officials remain adamant they will contest Beijing for influence and market share in strategic industries across Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The U.S. technological and economic relationship with Taiwan — however awkwardly each side may frame it — remains a core American interest that cannot be displaced even through productive head-of-state diplomacy.

Moreover, a single throughline still underpins American conduct toward China, fractious as it might appear: deep-seated and largely immutable grievances with China’s economic practices, including massive industrial subsidies, rampant intellectual property theft, and non-tariff barriers to trade. These grievances are shared by most Americans, members of both political parties, the President, traditional hawks, and ascendant economic nationalists within his administration. As the world witnessed in October, attempting to weaponize economic interdependence with the United States is the surest way to erode whatever goodwill both countries may have generated through shrewd diplomatic engagement.

The Future is Unwritten

China today holds tremendous sway over how the next several decades of the U.S.-China relationship will unfold. Accepting a “decent peace” could succeed in architecting something akin to the “new model of great-power relations” Beijing has long sought, while mistakenly exploiting American restraint will surely trigger a slide toward the very containment strategy it worked so hard to dismantle.

Scenario One: The GOP Fractures, Then Overcorrects

The current Republican alignment backing transactional diplomacy with China is more fragile than it appears. While the Restrainers are ascendant, they do not command uniform loyalty — and the institutional incentives that once drove the United States’ hawkish approach to China are once again gaining traction. Several members of Congress have already begun reclaiming authority to oversee aspects of alliance management, war powers, and licenses for AI chip exports. Close observers should have taken note of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act, which asserted oversight over U.S.-Taiwan contact guidance; while Congressional committees are reviewing executive agreements and mandating further arms sales to Taiwan.

If Beijing continues exploiting American goodwill and testing the terms of the Busan agreement, the political correction could be severe as key voices in both parties expose the costs of what they perceive to be unacceptable accommodation of Chinese adventurism. A Republican Party that feels it has been played by Beijing — or that faces electoral pressure from its hawkish base — could lurch violently toward containment to make up for lost time; while Democrats continuously hunt for opportunities to out-hawk the administration.

Scenario Two: Trump Feels Betrayed and Changes Course

Within the administration, willingness to negotiate is high but wholly contingent on China’s behavior. The President’s political position is fragile; his approval ratings have wavered; and his coalition is fractious. Trump has shown he is willing to suspend high-level diplomacy when he feels cheated — as when he threatened to cancel his planned summit with Xi Jinping following October’s sweeping rare earth licensing regime. It should be obvious that the President’s willingness to negotiate depends on sustaining genuine and visible wins for the American people.

But this is an unstable equilibrium. The President faces pressure to demonstrate the wisdom of his diplomacy with an adversary much of his base instinctively distrusts.

Every administration that has sought to cooperate with Beijing has faced that bizarre-but-familiar confluence of pressures: an incentive to claim success even when there is little to show for it, and an inability to acknowledge when Beijing is cheating. Under these ordinary circumstances, China can typically get away with just going through the motions or even defecting from the letter of a bilateral agreement with the United States. But pressing that luck now could prove fatal to the entire project. If the President falls into real political trouble — if the economy sours, if scandals multiply, if his coalition fragments — the temptation to blame China for American economic ailments will be overwhelming. A sudden snap-back of tariffs and export controls could materialize almost immediately. Beijing should not assume the current American posture is stable. The reality is that the current space for negotiation is fragile enough that even the appearance of China’s non-compliance could easily shatter it.

Scenario Three: A “Mutually Beneficial Economic Relationship” Takes Shape

The best-case scenario for China requires that Beijing demonstrate its own form of restraint. Perhaps managed diplomacy will succeed in producing modest success for both sides. The President can point to wins that benefit American workers and farmers — curbing fentanyl precursors to materially save American lives, guaranteeing access to rare earth minerals, and sustaining purchases of agricultural products on schedule; while China can find reprieve in a stabilized trade relationship and space for technological progress.

In this scenario, waning public appetite for U.S.-China confrontation might allow a modus vivendi to emerge that — while satisfying neither side’s maximalist preferences — allows both to focus on domestic priorities. A decent peace and mutually beneficial economic relationship could facilitate China’s continued rise without triggering a confrontation between superpowers. But this scenario requires discipline. It requires that Beijing resist the temptation to pocket American concessions and then press for more, understanding that the current negotiating space is fragile — and that defaulting to exploit American restraint will ultimately destroy it.

Which scenario we are headed toward will depend heavily on China’s actions over the next few years, and particularly right now, in 2026.

If Beijing doesn’t push its luck — if it avoids a cross-Strait imbroglio that could kill hundreds of thousands of people, upholds its end of the agreement struck in Busan, and commits seriously to developing a mutually beneficial economic relationship with the United States — then it may very well meet an American public less allergic to economic and technological integration, and give rise to a class of American elites willing to treat it as an equal.

But if Beijing interprets the current moment as license to consolidate its gains — through military pressure on Taiwan, gray-zone operations against the Philippines, economic coercion of American allies, or a strategy of global technological displacement — then it is sure to trigger exactly the backlash it seeks to avoid.

The Temptations of Triumph

The moment we find ourselves in rhymes uncomfortably with two episodes from the long 20th century: the misreading of Acheson’s restraint that spilled American and Chinese blood along the Yalu, and the wages of hubris from America’s own unipolar moment.

After 1991, the United States believed history had ended. It believed its power was unchallengeable and its values universal. It expanded NATO without serious consideration of Russian perceptions, launched campaigns to remake nations in its image, and assumed that economic integration with China could change its political system. It treated its hegemony as permanent, rather than contingent. The result was to breathe life into the very challengers American primacy was supposed to preempt.

China now faces its own version of this temptation. Its economy has grown faster than anyone predicted. Its military has modernized beyond recognition. Its technological capabilities have advanced at breakneck speed. And it now confronts an American administration that appears — for the first time in decades — willing to accept something other than Chinese subordination.

The temptation to press this advantage — to consolidate gains while Washington appears distracted or complaisant — must be overwhelming. It is precisely this mistake that goaded the United States into squandering its own moment of triumph. And it is precisely this mistake that could transform a manageable, even mutually beneficial competition into unmanageable catastrophe.

The arc of a stable U.S.-China relationship is Beijing’s to lose.

Will it find the grace to accept a decent peace?

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美国的克制及其底线

北京会接受一份体面的和平吗？

1950年1月12日，美国国务卿迪安·艾奇逊在全国新闻俱乐部发表了一场他本意只是例行公事的讲话，概述美国在亚洲的政策。他描述了一条“防御周界”，从阿留申群岛经日本和琉球群岛延伸至菲律宾——而在这一表述中，他疏忽了将韩国点名为美国核心的保护对象。

五个月后，朝鲜坦克越过了三八线。艾奇逊的遗漏是否真的鼓励了金日成的侵略，至今仍是历史争论的主题——1991年后开放的苏联档案表明，发动战争的决定可能早已在推进之中。但“认知”本身就足够重要：对美国在亚洲利益的暧昧，被平壤与莫斯科解读为可以动手的许可。当事实证明，美国在朝鲜的利益远比美国言辞所传达的更为攸关时，结果便是一场持续三年的战争，造成近3.7万名美国人死亡，并把中国拖入与美国的直接军事对抗。

七十五年过去了，华盛顿再次释放出混杂信号——而北京也再次面临着将美国表面上的克制误解为可以进一步试探底线的风险。

特朗普正在向中国提供任何一届前任政府都未曾考虑的东西：一份为中国的崛起腾出空间的“体面和平”。

北京是会理解并接受这份摆在桌面上的协议的限度，还是会因过度扩张而浪费掉一代人的机遇？

一、 “克制派”的崛起

几乎可以肯定，“克制派”正在赢得一场长达三十年的斗争，意在夺取共和党外交政策的缰绳，并以华盛顿许多人不愿接受的方式，深刻而不可逆地塑造美国的行为。

他们的上升在美国对华政策的操作中最为明显。特朗普总统在釜山与习近平达成战术性缓和后的几个月里，其政府达成协议，使TikTok在事实上仍处于字节跳动的有效控制之下；对中国对日本与台湾施加的军事压力视若无睹；下调对华关税，使其几乎仅比对某些美国盟友的关税略高；逆转对先进人工智能芯片的出口管制；撤销聚焦技术竞争与外国恶意影响的办公室；并劝阻国会采取更强硬的行动，以追究中国的越界行为。

特朗普本人也在推动“美中G2”的叙事框架，更倾向于通过挑选更有限、可取胜的战斗来积累美国力量。今天，美国正向中国提供一种几乎等同于对过去十年支撑美国政策的“大国竞争逻辑”的激进背离：在亚洲达成一份体面和平，以及一种能够容纳中国崛起的、互利的经济关系。

许多共和党人——长期以来以抵御中国掠夺为荣——正艰难地接受这一现实。有些人仍坚持认为，这种交易式的斡旋也许实际上构成了对北京在特定战区的战略施压的延续，甚至是升级；而这种施压长期以来一直是该党身份认同的重要组成部分。

但在中国官员看来，这就是它本来的样子：美国政策的一次巨变。许多人对华盛顿终于形成对中国力量的“准确认知”表示如释重负；另一些人则暗示“让美国再次伟大”和中国未必必须成为敌人”。如今有些对话者自信到一种程度，甚至在《外交事务》的版面上向美国推销一项“宏大交易”。

的确，美国对中国力量的认知发生了巨大更新：这是第一次，今天大多数美国人认为中国甚至比美国更强大。危险在于，这种自信有可能扼杀北京曾不惜代价谋划的未来。在多个领域、多个战区，中国正在测试美国。自12月以来，它公然入侵国会工作人员的手机；在台湾周边发动规模空前的实弹演习；并拖延农产品采购与稀土许可——或许是认为美国缺乏能力或政治意愿进行反制。

特朗普政府提出的脆弱“美中缓和”值得严肃对待——但它能否持续，将取决于中国下一步的行动。釜山之后的“宿醉感”已经开始显现。此刻任何越界之举，都必然把两国拖回灾难性的对抗之中。

二、 北京应当明白的两件事

中国战略家应当明白，摆在桌面上的这份“交易”包含两条令人不适的真相：

第一，一些分析人士所称的美国“撤退”，更准确地应被理解为美国在保留选择权。把当下姿态解读为收缩的人，是把战术上的不按常理出牌误当作战略性的退出。现实是，华盛顿正在对盟友与对手一视同仁地推进强硬谈判，而非放弃战场。2026年《国家防务战略》明确指出，美国对“力量均衡”的构想不会接受中国在亚洲的主导地位，也不会把“势力范围”让给任何其他霸权。文件直言不讳地写道，美国的目标“不是要支配中国；也不是要扼杀或羞辱中国”。相反，它向北京提供了国防部长赫格塞思转呈信中所称的“一份体面和平”——“条件对美国有利，但中国也可以接受并在其下生活”。然而，即便在递出橄榄枝的同时，《国家防务战略》仍承诺维持“沿第一岛链的强大拒止防御”——其中必然包括继续与盟友军演、对台军售，以及“在全球任何地点对目标实施毁灭性打击与行动的能力”。

北京所感知的美国软弱，在华盛顿看来只是谈判姿态。无论这种想法多么误判，美国确实相信它可以同时向东京与首尔要求前所未有的负担分担，向台北索取技术转移，向格陵兰攫取矿产权益——同时仍维持由美国主导的印太安全基本架构。在达沃斯，财政部长贝森特传递了一条真诚的信息：“美国优先不等于美国孤立。”政府对中国挑衅的例行关切并非空洞。即便它敦促盟友为自身防务承担更多负担，美国仍在继续预置军需物资并建设基础设施，以制衡中国在亚洲的主导。总统或许会经营与习近平的富有成效的关系，但其政府对中国的基本评估——把中国视作需要制衡的对手，而非需要迁就的霸权——并未改变。

第二，“体面和平”的承诺是有条件的，而美国的红线并未移动。《国家防务战略》结语中的措辞，北京应当仔细阅读：“如果我们的潜在对手愚蠢到拒绝我们的和平提议而选择冲突，美国武装力量将随时准备作战并赢得国家的战争。”这不是一个正在撤退的大国的语言，而是一个超级大国提出共存条件——并警告若拒绝这些条件将承担严重后果——的语言。

美国在亚洲仍拥有非同寻常的经济利益，并将中国视为该战区内的首要竞争对手。尽管特朗普治下的华盛顿已释放信号，表示不会试图摧毁中国经济、威胁中共领导层，或遏制其技术崛起，但美国官员仍坚称，将在东南亚、南亚、非洲与拉丁美洲的战略产业中与北京争夺影响力与市场份额。美国与台湾之间的技术与经济关系——无论双方如何尴尬地表述——仍是美国核心利益之一，即便通过富有成效的元首外交也无法被置换。

此外，美国对华行为仍有一条贯穿始终的主线，尽管表面看起来纷乱：对中国经济做法的深层且在很大程度上不可改变的不满，包括巨额产业补贴、猖獗的知识产权盗窃，以及非关税贸易壁垒。这些不满为大多数美国人、两党人士、总统本人、传统鹰派以及其政府内部崛起的经济民族主义者所共享。正如世界在10月所见，试图将与美国的经济相互依赖武器化，是侵蚀两国通过精明外交互动所可能积累的任何善意的最可靠方式。

三、 未来尚未写定

中国今天在很大程度上掌握着未来几十年美中关系将如何展开的主导权。接受“一份体面和平”，或许能成功塑造某种类似北京长期追求的“新型大国关系”；而误用美国的克制、把它当作可被利用的弱点，则必然触发滑向北京曾竭力拆解的那套遏制战略。

情景一：共和党分裂，随后过度纠偏

当前共和党内部支持对华交易式外交的结盟，比看起来更为脆弱。尽管克制派正在上升，但他们并未获得一致忠诚——而曾推动美国对华强硬路线的制度性激励，正再次积聚势能。国会已有数名成员开始重新夺回对联盟管理、战争权力以及人工智能芯片出口许可等方面的监督权。密切观察者本应注意到《台湾保证实施法案》，该法案主张对美台接触指引进行监督；与此同时，国会委员会正在审查行政协议，并要求进一步对台军售。

如果北京继续利用美国善意、不断测试釜山协议条款，那么当两党关键人物揭示他们所认为的对中国冒进的不可接受迁就之成本时，政治纠偏可能会非常剧烈。一个自觉“被北京耍了”的共和党——或在其鹰派基本盘的选举压力下——可能会为弥补“失去的时间”而猛然转向遏制；而民主党则会不断寻找机会在对华强硬上超越本届政府。

情景二：特朗普感到被背叛并改变路线

在政府内部，谈判意愿很高，但完全取决于中国的行为。总统的政治地位并不稳固；其支持率起伏不定；其联盟内部矛盾丛生。特朗普已经表明，当他觉得被欺骗时，他愿意暂停高层外交——例如在10月中国推出广泛的稀土许可制度后，他曾威胁取消与习近平的计划峰会。显而易见，总统愿意谈判的前提，是必须持续为美国人民带来真实且可见的胜利。

但这是一种不稳定的均衡。总统面临压力，需要证明与一个其基本盘本能不信任的对手进行外交的“英明”。

每一个试图与北京合作的美国政府都遭遇过那种怪异却熟悉的压力交汇：即便几乎没有成果，也有激励去宣称成功；同时又缺乏在北京作弊时坦承现实的能力。在这种常见情境下，中国通常可以通过走过场，甚至背离美中双边协议的字面要求而不受惩罚。但在当下继续“赌运气”，可能会对整个项目造成致命打击。如果总统陷入真实的政治困境——如果经济转坏、丑闻增多、联盟破裂——把美国经济问题归咎于中国的诱惑将压倒一切。关税与出口管制的突然回弹几乎可能立即发生。北京不应假设当前美国姿态稳定。现实是，当下谈判空间极其脆弱，甚至只要出现“中国不履约”的认知，就足以将其击碎。

情景三：“互利的经济关系”成形

对中国而言的最佳情景，要求北京展现自身的克制。或许经管式外交能够为双方带来有限但真实的成功。总统可以指向有利于美国工人与农民的胜利——实质性遏制芬太尼前体以挽救美国生命，确保稀土矿产供应，以及按计划维持农产品采购；而中国则可以在稳定的贸易关系中获得喘息空间，并争取技术进步的余地。

在这一情景下，美国公众对美中对抗的兴趣下降，可能让一种“权宜共处”逐步出现：尽管无法满足双方的最大化偏好，却能让两国把重心转向国内优先事项。一份体面的和平与互利的经济关系，或许能使中国继续崛起而不触发超级大国之间的对抗。但这一情景需要纪律——需要北京抵制把美国让步“收入囊中”后再继续加码的诱惑，理解当下谈判空间脆弱，并认识到默认通过利用美国克制来获利，最终只会摧毁这种空间。

我们将走向哪一种情景，很大程度上取决于中国未来几年、尤其是当下2026年的行动。

如果北京不去试运气——如果它避免在两岸引爆可能造成数十万人死亡的危机；履行在釜山达成的协议；并认真致力于与美国发展互利的经济关系——那么它很可能会遇到一个对经济与技术整合不那么过敏的美国公众，并促成一批愿意把中国当作平等者对待的美国精英阶层。

但如果北京把当前时刻解读为巩固既得成果的许可证——通过对台军事施压、对菲律宾的灰色地带行动、对美国盟友的经济胁迫，或推行一种全球技术替代战略——那么它必然会触发其最想避免的反弹。

四、胜利的诱惑

我们所处的时刻，与漫长的20世纪中两段历史形成令人不安的押韵：一段是对艾奇逊克制的误读，在鸭绿江边溢出美中鲜血；另一段则是美国自身单极时刻的傲慢代价。

1991年之后，美国相信历史已经终结。它相信自己的力量不可挑战，价值具有普遍性。它在未认真考虑俄罗斯认知的情况下扩张北约，发动按自身形象改造他国的战争，并假设与中国的经济融合能够改变其政治制度。它把自身霸权当作永久存在，而非取决于条件的结果。最终，这些做法反而为那些本应被美国优势所“预先阻止”的挑战者注入了生命力。

中国如今也面临自己的版本的诱惑。它的经济增长超出所有人的预测。它的军队已现代化到面目全非。它的技术能力以惊人的速度推进。并且它如今面对一个看起来——数十年来第一次——愿意接受某种并非“让中国屈从”的美国政府。

在华盛顿显得分心或顺从之时，趁势压上、巩固既得成果的诱惑必定巨大。正是这种错误曾诱使美国挥霍自身胜利时刻。也正是这种错误，可能把一场可控、甚至互利的竞争，变成不可控的灾难。

一段稳定的美中关系之弧线，最终取决于北京是否将其亲手葬送。

北京是否能有那份风度，接受一份体面的和平？